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1. Introduction 
It is surprising how little attention academic literature has devoted to understand equity market 
returns around the turn of the month, despite the observations of Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) and 
McConnell and Xu (2008), among others, that historically most of the equity returns have accrued 
during a four-day period, from the last trading day to the third trading day of the month. Even less 
attention has received the fact that in more recent samples the market returns are abnormally high 
also on the last three trading days before the turn of the month. In fact, combining the two 
observations, we find that since July 1926, one could have held the US value-weighted stock index 
(CRSP) for only seven days a month and pocketed the entire market excess return with nearly fifty 
percent lower volatility compared to a buy and hold strategy. The negative excess returns outside the 
seven day turn of the month period are driven by dismal stock returns during the five trading days 
that immediately precede the high turn of the month return period (see Figure 1).1 2  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
Following Odgen (1990), we find that the origin of the turn of the month return patterns lies in the 
monthly economic payment cycle – the fact that disproportionate part of the monthly payments in the 
US economy, for instance those by pension funds (pensions), corporate treasuries (dividends), and 
mutual funds (distributions) take place precisely at the turn of the month, as we document below. 
Given this payment cycle, every month potentially billions of dollars invested in the financial 
market, including in the stock market, first gets liquidated some time prior to the month end; then 
distributed as cash to pensioners and equity and mutual fund investors (among others) at the month 
end; only to be later re-invested back into the financial market by the recipients of the month end 
cash payments. Evidencing the magnitude of the payment cycle, we find that the deposits in the US 
commercial banks rise visibly on the last day of the month and then decline during the first few days 
of the month.  
 
Consistent with the payment cycle, we uncover strong return reversals in the aggregate stock market 
around key dates near the turn of the month. In addition, we present empirical evidence that crisply 
links the stocks’ turn of the month return patterns to institutional investors’ buy-sell ratios, mutual 
fund holdings, stock-level liquidity and volatility, and to the funding conditions in the capital market. 
Time-varying betas of mutual funds and hedge funds provide additional supporting evidence. Taken 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 From now on we will refer to “trading days” simply as “days” although all countings of days in this paper 
refer to countings of trading days. 
2 McConnell and Xu (2008)  and Cadsby and Ratner (1992) show that the turn of the month returns are high in 
most developed markets. Dzhabarov and Ziemba (2010) show that also US equity index futures exhibit a 
similar turn of the month effect.	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together, our results suggest a coherent heuristic framework that ties the turn-of-the-month return 
patterns to the institutional payment cycle coupled with market-wide limits of arbitrage. 
 
Our first observation is that due to the current 3-day settlement period in the US equity market (this 
settlement period is the most common one in stocks also internationally) the investors’ turn of the 
month liquidity related selling of stocks must come to an end three days prior to the turn of the 
month. Let us label this critical day T-3, where T denotes the last day of the month. Under perfectly 
efficient markets, market makers and speculators would ensure that prices are not affected by this 
type of liquidity related sell orders, which do not reflect any investment views. However, in the 
absence of sufficient speculative capital, see e.g. Grossman and Miller (1988), Gromb and Vayanos 
(2002) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), it is likely that market prices prior to T-3 get 
temporarily depressed due to the selling pressure, and that it takes some time for the prices to revert 
back to their fundamental values. This is the main hypothesis of our paper. As Odgen (1990) argues, 
in the beginning of the month there should in turn be positive price pressure in the stock market as 
the recipients of the month end cash payments invest new money into the stock market. Our second 
hypothesis is therefore that the beginning of the month buying pressure temporarily elevates the 
stock prices above fundamentals, and that there is return reversal after the buying pressure 
subsumes.3  
 
Surprisingly, we find that many of the turn of the month return patterns that we document have 
become more pronounced over time, and the strength of these phenomena seems to be related to the 
proportion of institutional investors in the market. One potential explanation to this is that although 
the payments by individuals are also likely to be clustered at the month end, this is especially the 
case for institutions. There is, however, also another route through which the increased role of 
institutions in the stock market may have affected the turn of the month phenomenon. Namely, we 
find that the institutional investors seem to avoid risk taking near the month ends. Given this, it is 
possible that the increased role of institutions has not only led to additional selling pressure prior to 
T-3 (by the institutions with month end liquidity needs), but also to a decreased willingness among 
market participants to accommodate any selling pressure near the month end. 4 5 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For evidence that the 3-day settlement convention is most common internationally, see e.g. Thomas Murray 
Ltd. 2014 report ”CMI In Focus: Equities Settlement Cycles.” In the US, the 3-day settlement convention was 
adopted in June 1995.  4 One reason why the mutual funds seem to reduce their risks near the month end can be their window dressing 
ahead of their month end reporting. Mutual funds’ window dressing is discussed e.g. in Lakonishok, Shleifer, 
Thaler and Vishny (1991).	  5	  Seasonalities in institutional investors’ portfolio rebalancing, due e.g. to popularity of asset allocation 
meetings near the month ends, can yet be another factor that amplifies the investors’ selling pressure near the 
month end and buying pressure in the beginning of the month.	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Our empirical evidence related to the turn of the month returns, the market return reversals, and the 
institutions role in causing the turn of the month return patterns, can be divided into four main 
categories: 
 
1. Evidence from market returns. Looking at aggregate market prices alone, we find 
significant predictability in the stock market returns around the third business day before the 
month end. The market returns on the five business days preceding T-3 are negative, in 
contrast to the subsequent three business days’ returns, which have been highly positive. One 
of our main findings is to show that lower than average market returns before T-3 tend to be 
followed by higher than average subsequent returns, thus providing evidence of market 
return reversals around T-3. Our evidence on return reversals around T-3 is not limited to the 
US: In all 24 markets that we survey, there is evidence of return reversals around T-3, and in 
18 of the 24 markets the return reversals are statistically significant. Furthermore, in line 
with our second hypothesis, we find that higher than average returns on the first three 
business days of the month are followed by lower than average returns on the following five 
days. These return reversals following the first 3 days’ returns are statistically significant in 
12 out of the 24 countries. This evidence on return reversals is consistent with the idea that 
payment cycle and the limits of arbitrage affect the turn of the month returns as we discussed 
earlier.6 7 
 
2. Evidence from trading data for institutional investors. To find support for the hypothesis 
that the turn of the month return patterns are in part caused by the price pressure from 
institutional investors’ liquidity related trading, we study a data set (obtained from Abel 
Noser Solutions) that contains trade-level observations for hundreds of different institutional 
investors (mutual funds, hedge funds, pension funds, and other asset managers). This dataset 
is considered to be highly representative sample of institutional investors’ trading in the US 
stock market.  
 
Our analysis reveals that there are indeed significant seasonalities in the institutions’ relative 
tendency to submit buy and sell orders. It appears that, consistent with our hypothesis, 
institutions are first net sellers in the market up to T-3, and later net buyers on the last two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Interestingly, the return reversal phenomenon is not equally consistently present in emerging markets. This 
could be due to different shareholder structure in the emerging markets, where the role of mutual funds and 
other institutional investors is smaller, or due to liquidity and transaction cost concerns.  7 As a robustness check, to further test the idea that the payment cycle contributes to the turn of the month 
patterns, we show in Table A1 in the Appendix that similar but less pronounced patterns in market returns in 
the US are observed around another common payment date, the 15th of each month. In addition, we find that in 
the US, the abnormally negative returns prior to the high turn of the month return period have moved closer to 
the turn of the month since the shortening of the settlement period from four to three in June 1995.  
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days of the month, and on the first few days of the month. These findings are direct evidence 
to support the idea that institutional trading affects stock returns around turn of the month. 
As additional support for the idea that the institutions’ trading causes the high returns prior 
to the turn of the month, we document using regression analysis that their net sales on days 
T-5 to T-4 (normalized by the stock market capitalization) significantly impact the 
subsequent stock market returns on days T-3 to T-1. 
 
Combining the evidence regarding the market returns around the turn of the month and the 
institutional investors’ trading patterns leads us to conclude that the institutions suffer from 
mistiming their trades around the turn of the month. These costs are eventually borne by the 
pensioners and the investors that invest through the institutions.8  
 
3. Evidence related to mutual funds and the cross section of stocks. We studied further the 
role of institutional investors using data on mutual fund holdings and by looking at the turn 
of the month patterns in the cross-section of stocks. First, we link in the cross-section of 
stocks the stocks’ month end return reversals to mutual funds’ holdings. Our findings 
indicate that stocks held in greater proportions by mutual funds exhibit more pronounced 
turn of the month patterns: more negative returns between T-8 to T-4 and more positive 
returns from T-3 to T-1. In addition, those stocks exhibit greater return reversals around T-3. 
Furthermore, in an international sample, we find that the market return reversals around T-3 
are stronger in countries with larger mutual fund sectors. Finally, we show that the strength 
of the return reversal around T-3 in the US stock market has varied over time with the 
proportion of the market held by the mutual fund industry. 
 
Other pieces of evidence lend further support to the link between the turn of the month 
return patterns and mutual funds. For example, consistent with the idea that there are cash 
transfers in and out of the mutual fund sector around the turn of the month, we find that the 
average market beta of the mutual fund industry varies near the month end and is 
significantly lower than average at time T-3. Furthermore, consistent with the idea that 
mutual funds reduce risks towards the end of the month (either to increase their cash 
holdings in order to meet their end of month payments or for agency reasons), we find that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 We made a back of the envelope calculation where we compared the actual trading of the institutions 
in our sample to hypothetical trading of same size but with better market timing. In particular, we 
considered a scenario had those institutions made at T both all the (net) purchases that they in fact 
made during the days T+1 to T+3 and all the (net) sales that they in fact made during the days T-8 to 
T-3. To ease the calculation, we made a simplifying assumption that all prices would have moved in 
line with the market during those days. This calculation led to an estimate that during our sample 
period from 1999 – 2013 the institutions included in our dataset alone would have lost roughly 1.3 
billion US dollars due to mistiming their trades around the turn of the month.  	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mutual funds’ average return volatility declines towards the end of the month although there 
is no observable decline in the volatility of the stock returns in general towards the month 
end. 
 
We also find evidence that the turn of the month returns and return reversals vary as a 
function of stocks’ liquidity. In particular, we find that month-end reversals are statistically 
more significant for larger and more liquid stocks, which is consistent with the idea that turn 
of the month patterns are tied to investors liquidity needs, and that investors respond to 
month-end outflows and cash needs conscious of transaction costs. Similarly, we find that 
following the end of the month, the first three days’ returns revert only for liquid stocks. For 
illiquid stocks, it seems that the investors’ purchases are more gradual and continue past the 
first three days, causing positive, not negative autocorrelation in returns between the first 
three days’ returns and the returns thereafter. This again is consistent with the idea that 
market participants are conscious of their price impact in the stock market when taking 
positions in the beginning of each month.9 
 
Finally, we present evidence that the mutual funds’ turn of the month trading patterns affects 
their alpha. For instance, we find that mutual funds’ Carhart four factor alpha is significantly 
positive for the two highest deciles of funds with historically highest correlation in their T-8 
to T-4 and T-3 to T-1 returns (alpha being negative for all other funds).  
 
4. Evidence related to hedge funds and funding conditions. Surprisingly, we find little 
evidence that hedge funds would mitigate the month-end return patterns. Akin to our results 
for mutual funds, we find that the market betas of most hedge funds vary around the turn of 
the month, so that they are smaller before the month end than at the beginning of the month. 
These patterns are stronger for funds with less frequent redemption cycles. Our results 
therefore suggest that most hedge funds are also plagued by similar month-end cash and 
agency concerns as mutual funds. As hedge funds are typically the institutions that supply 
liquidity in the stock markets, see e.g. Aragon and Strahan (2012) and Jylhä, Rinne and 
Suominen (2014), the hedge funds’ unwillingness or inability to take long positions near the 
month end, despite the selling pressure from mutual funds, can lead to low liquidity in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Finally, controlling for liquidity, we find that the reversal patterns are stronger for more volatile 
stocks, which is consistent with the idea that speculators’ risk bearing ability is limited around the end 
of the month. 	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market prior to the month end. Consistent with this, we document a decrease in market 
trading volume around T-3.10  
 
Finally, our time-series evidence lends support to the idea that institutions’ funding 
conditions in the credit market affect the month-end return reversals in the stock market: 
poor funding conditions, as indicated by an elevated TED-spread are associated with greater 
return reversals around T-3 (TED-spread is a common proxy for the hedge funds’ ability to 
leverage their positions). This result is consistent with the limits of arbitrage literature and in 
particular the idea presented in Brunnermeier and Perdersen (2009) that speculators’ funding 
constraints affect their ability to supply liquidity (in our case to those institutions with turn of 
the month liquidity needs).  
 
 
The intuition that asynchronously arriving sellers and buyers to the stock market cause short-term 
return reversals in equity returns has been present in the literature for a long time, see e.g., Grossman 
and Miller (1988). However, only limited empirical support for the idea that investors’ aggregate 
buying and selling pressures would lead to market level short-term return reversals has been 
presented. To our knowledge only two papers show evidence on this. First, Campbell, Grossman and 
Wang (1997) show that high trading volume in the stock market (signaling buying or selling pressure 
from some groups of investors in their model) reduces the otherwise positive autocorrelation in stock 
index returns in their sample. Second, Ben-Raphael, Kandel, and Wohl (2011) provide evidence that 
aggregate mutual fund flows in Israel created price pressure in the aggregate stock market leading to 
market level short-term return reversals. However, they do not tie these market level short-term 
return reversals to the turn of the month time period. Given this, our finding that the investors’ 
systematic selling and buying pressures around the turn of the month cause short-term return 
reversals at a market level is new to the literature. Importantly, our findings help tie the anomalous 
turn-of-the-month returns to the standard theories on imperfectly functioning financial markets and 
limits of arbitrage (see Gromb and Vayanos, 2012, for a survey of this literature).11 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 If we look at each hedge fund category separately, we find that funds in only two hedge fund categories 
(managed futures and global macro) seem to provide liquidity to other market participants prior to the turn-of-
the month: funds in those categories increase their market betas significantly at T-3 on average. Even here, the 
evidence is weak for the global macro funds. 11	  In the Campbell, Grossman and Wang (1997) model return reversals are associated with large volume as the 
investors’ selling pressure in their model is time varying, while the market making capacity is not. Our 
research suggests that in the stock market around the turn of the month the selling pressure, the buying 
pressure, and the market making capacity are all time varying, explaining why large reversals may be 
associated with low volume (as we find is the case around T-3). Other closely related papers include Duffie 
(2010), which presents several examples of return reversals due to supply and demand shocks in various 
markets, including in the cross section of stocks, and Mou (2010) which presents similar systematic calendar 
related return reversals due to investor rebalancing in the commodity markets.	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Our results contribute to the vast existing literature on turn of the month effects that dates back at 
least to the seminal paper of Ariel (1987). Taken together, these studies report abnormally high 
returns over the four-day period from the last to the third trading day of the month. To the best of our 
knowledge, our study is the first one to focus on market behavior around the last day of the month 
that guarantees settlement before the month end. Also, we believe we are the first ones to link the 
turn of the month return patterns crisply to institutional investors’ buy-sell ratios, the mutual fund 
holdings, stocks’ liquidity and volatility, the mutual and hedge funds’ time varying betas, and to the 
funding conditions in the capital market.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in our research. 
Sections 3-7 present our main empirical results that cover the cross-sectional and time-series 
dimensions of the data. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Data on returns, mutual funds and hedge funds 
The country index return data are from Datastream, except in the case of the US value-weighted 
index, which is obtained from CRSP. Our US index return data are from January 1980 through 
January 2014. Our international sample consists of the benchmark indexes of G10 countries in 
addition to other selected industrialized countries. For many countries the sample period starts later 
than 1980, when the relevant data becomes available. Most of the international index returns include 
dividends, but due to lack of data some of them are partly based on price indexes to maximize the 
country specific sample periods. In case of Israel, the price index is used for the entire sample period 
as the return index is not available in Datastream. 
 
Our cross-sectional stock data are from CRSP. The sample period is equal to the index sample except 
that our individual stock return data ends in December 2013. Our mutual fund holdings data is from 
Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings database. The sample period is from January 1980 to 
December 2013. MFLINKS is used to combine different mutual fund classes. Mutual fund betas are 
estimated using daily mutual fund returns from the CRSP U.S. Mutual Fund database. The data on 
Hedge fund AUM is estimated similarly as that in Jylhä and Suominen (2011). Finally the hedge 
fund betas are estimated using the LIPPER TASS data on individual funds’ monthly returns.  
 
3. Turn of the month stock returns in the US and internationally 
We begin our investigation by determining the relevant time periods before and after the event date, 
T-3. Theoretically, an institution facing cash liabilities at the month end could sell his stocks as late 
as at the close of T-3 and still receive the cash in time for his month end payment. However, 
illiquidity and risk considerations are likely to deter most institutions with month end liquidity needs 
9	  	  
from selling stocks only at the close of T-3, but rather encourage it to distribute its equity sales over 
the preceding hours and days. In fact, judging also from the market returns, it seems that the price 
pressure from the institutional investors’ turn of the month selling is at its highest one day prior to T-
3, on day T-4. We later provide direct evidence from institutions trading to support this assumption. 
For these reasons, we begin our analysis by considering the five business days, T-8 to T-4 as the 
period over which we expect the most negative price pressure in the stock market due to the equity 
sales by the institutions facing month-end cash liabilities.  
 
Following the month-end settlement, part of the cash distributed to salaried employees and 
pensioners gets reinvested in the stock market via 401k contributions (often automatic) and self-
directed investments. This effect has been studied extensively in the existing literature, see e.g. 
Odgen (1990), which reports above-average stock returns from the last business day of the month 
until the third business day of the month, i.e. from T to T+3 (see e.g., McConnell and Xu, 2008). We 
include this period as part of our study but separate it from the days before the month end and the 
returns after T+3. 
 
We illustrate some key events of our study in Figure 2 along with the daily average returns of the 
CRSP value weighted stock index for each business day surrounding the month end. Consistent with 
our understanding of the events, average returns are low from T-8 to T-4 (selling pressure) and high 
from T-3 to T-1 (return reversal). As money begins to get reinvested in the market at the month end 
and shortly after the month end, returns are again high from T to T+3 (buying pressure) and low 
from T+4 to T+8 (return reversal). The differences in returns are economically meaningful: for 
example, the average annualized S&P 500 return from T-8 to T-4 is -3.4% versus 28.6% from T-3 to 
T+3.12 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
We can observe similar return patterns in other developed markets, as those displayed in Table 1. For 
all of the 24 markets in our sample, returns are statistically indistinguishable from zero over the 
selling pressure periods (T-8 to T-4) and positive and statistically significant over the reversal/buying 
pressure period from T-3 to T+3. Importantly, in Table 2 we establish a time-series relationship 
between low returns over the selling pressure period of T-8 to T-4 and the returns over the reversal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Interestingly, the average excess returns that accrue to investors during the seven business days around the 
turn of the month cannot be explained by exposures to well-known risk factors: the CAPM alpha of the 
strategy is 5.6% per annum, the  Fama and French (1993) three-factor alpha is 6.2% per annum; and the alpha 
with respect to a five-factor model that also includes the momentum factor of Carhart (1997) and the liquidity 
factor of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) is 6.3% per annum. All alphas are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Results are qualitatively similar if instead of the CRSP value weighted index returns we use the S&P 500 
index returns in the alpha calculations. 
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period T-3 to T-1: in all of the 24 markets the correlation of returns between these two periods is 
negative and in 18 out of 24 markets the correlation is statistically significant. This evidence 
suggests that the below-average returns over the selling pressure periods are associated with above-
average subsequent return reversals. Similarly the time-series correlation between the returns on days 
T to T+3 and the subsequent five days’ returns is either insignificant or negative and statistically 
significant (in 12 of the 24 markets). These negative correlations are consistent with our hypothesis 
that there is initially selling pressure and then buying pressure from investors around the turn of the 
month.13 14 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 AND 2 HERE] 
 
4. Direct evidence from institutional investors’ trades 
To find support for the price pressure hypothesis as an explanation for the turn of the month returns, 
we study a data set that contains trade-level observations for hundreds of different institutions (hedge 
funds, mutual funds, pension funds, and other money managers). Our data is from Abel Noser 
Solutions (ANcerno) and it covers the years from 1999 to 2013. According to Pucket and Yan 
(2011), this data includes the trades of many of the largest institutional investors such as CalPERS, 
the YMCA retirement fund, Putman Investments, and Lazard Asset Management. It has been used in 
extensively in academic research papers recently as it provides a highly representative sample of the 
institutional fund management. During our sample period the institutions covered in this dataset 
account for nearly 6% of the daily volume in CRSP.  
 
Using the ANcerno data we find that indeed there are significant seasonalities in the institutions’ 
buy-sell ratios, so that consistent with our hypothesis the institutions in the ANcerno data seem to 
submit more sell than buy orders in the week that precedes T-3, and more buy than sell orders in the 
days T-1 to T+4. On several days, such as T-5 to T-3, T-1 to T, and T+3 and T+5, the buy ratios 
(based on dollar volumes of trade) differ statistically significantly from their unconditional mean. 
The averages of the abnormal buy ratios on various days around the turn of the month are presented 
in Figure 3.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13 The results from the emerging markets are mixed. We regard this as evidence in favor of our hypothesis that 
the observed return reversals in developed markets are driven by efficient balance sheet management by 
institutional investors who are conscious of transaction costs and liquidity issues. We discuss these 
considerations in the next section. The unreported results from the emerging markets are available from the 
authors. 
14 The return patterns around T-3 documented in Tables 1 and 2 are robust to excluding from the sample the 
observations that correspond with year ends, quarter ends, observations that immediately precede the FED 
announcements (that have been found to significantly affect expected returns in Lucca and Moench, 2015) or 
observations overlapping with macro-economic announcement dates (that have been found to significantly 
affect returns in Savor and Wilson, 2013).	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 [INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
 
In line with the stock return patterns, the buy ratio calculated using the dollar volumes suggests that 
the selling pressure from institutions is at its highest on day T-4. Note however from Figure 3 that the 
institutions’ selling seems to continue on day T-3, even though the returns (measured from the 
closing prices) suggest that the price pressure from selling starts to ease already on that day. These 
observations can be consistent with each other, however. There are at least two reasons why we 
should expect that the price pressure from institutions selling would subsume some time prior to the 
close of the day T-3. As we argued in the introduction, liquidity and risk considerations most likely 
prevent institutions from leaving large orders related to their turn of the month payment needs to the 
close of the day T-3. Secondly, the speculators’ stock demand can be expected to increase during the 
day T-3, as after that day the selling pressure is expected to subside and the stocks are likely to rise 
(if our reasoning is correct). Looking at the institutional investors’ execution times in the ANcerno 
data within the day T-3, we find that institutions are net sellers in the morning of T-3 (this finding is 
statistically significant at a 1% level), while in the afternoon of T-3 the number of buy orders from 
institutions already roughly equals that of their sell orders. For these reasons, it is understandable 
that, on average, by the end of the day T-3 the prices have started their recovery from the turn of the 
month related selling pressure.  
 
ANcerno data provides additional direct evidence of the effect of institutions on the turn of the 
month return patterns. In Table 3, we show that the institutions’ cumulative net sales during the days 
T-5 to T-4 (normalized by the stock market capitalization) negatively affect the stock market returns 
on days T-3 to T-1. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
Next we will try to confirm the large role of institutions in the creation of the selling and buying 
pressure around the turn of the month by looking at a different set of data related to the mutual fund 
industry. We will also investigate in which types of stocks the turn of the month phenomena is the 
strongest. 
 
5. Cross-sectional evidence 
5.1 Return reversals in the cross-section of stock returns 
We begin our cross-sectional investigation with a straightforward extension of our aggregate stock 
market study. Concretely, we sort the stocks in the CRSP universe each month based on their 
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performance over the period where we expect selling pressure, T-8 to T-4, and observe their average 
returns over the subsequent three days where we expect reversals, T-3 to T-1, and over the 
subsequent four days, T to T+3, which includes the month end and days where we expect 
reinvestment-driven buying pressure. The results, displayed in Table 4 demonstrate that stocks with 
the poorest performances over the selling pressure period tend to exhibit best average performances 
over the subsequent three and seven days. The relationship holds monotonically across our decile 
portfolios, formed based on stocks’ each month's T-8 to T-4 returns. The difference in average 
returns between the lowest and the highest decile portfolios is both statistically and economically 
significant: 0.8% over the three-day period T-3 to T-1, and 0.5% over the next four-day period T to 
T+3.15 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
For completeness, we also conduct an analogous exercise for the period T+4 to T+8, where we 
expect reversal from the beginning of the month buying pressure. The results, displayed also in Table 
4, demonstrate that the T+4 to T+8 average returns across the decile portfolios sorted based on T to 
T+3 returns decline in the T to T+3 returns with a large and statistically significant difference in 
average returns between the extreme deciles. 
 
We conclude that the month-end return patterns we observed for aggregate market indices also hold 
for portfolios of individual stocks and the strength of return reversals is inversely proportional to the 
stocks’ performance over the selling/buying pressure periods. 
 
5.2 Mutual fund ownership and month-end stock returns 
We proposed that the return reversals in aggregate stock returns at the turn of the month are likely 
driven by sales of stocks by institutional investors with month-end cash liabilities. If so, we would 
expect the stocks owned in greater proportions by such investors to exhibit stronger return reversals. 
While we do not directly observe the holdings of pension funds, whose payment obligations are 
predominantly clustered at the month end (Figure 4A), we do observe the holdings of their agents, 
mutual funds, which provide an easy and efficient implementation vehicle for diversified equity 
investments for pension funds. In addition to the pension funds’ payment schedule, the dividend 
payments of mutual funds themselves also tend to cluster around the turn of the month (Figure 4B).16 
Furthermore, the dividends of corporations received by mutual funds are also predominantly paid 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  In our sample we eliminate penny stocks and the smallest market capitalization stocks out of our cross-
sectional sample, by requiring that the stock price is at least $5 and the stock’s market capitalization is above 
the 10th percentile of the NYSE listed stocks on the 10th trading day of the corresponding month. 	  
16 The only exception is the month of December where the dividend payments are more evenly distributed. 
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around the turn of the month (Figure 4C). For all of these reasons we suspect that the turn of the 
month effects are more pronounced in the stocks that are commonly held by mutual funds.  
 
[INSERT FIGURES 4A to 4C] 
 
To investigate the link between mutual fund ownership and month-end return patterns, we sort the 
US stocks in each month by mutual funds' collective ownership percentage in the previous month 
and form decile portfolios. We then compute the average returns of these portfolios near the turn of 
the month. The results are displayed in Figure 5. Consistent with our hypothesis, the stocks that are 
held to a greater extent by mutual funds in a given month tend to experience monotonically lower 
returns over the selling pressure periods, from T-8 to T-4. These same stocks also experience greater 
returns over the subsequent three days from T-3 to T-1, and again monotonically lower average 
returns from T+4 to T+8. Finally, the correlation between T-8 to T-4 and T-3 to T-1 returns is more 
negative for those stocks that are more commonly held by mutual funds. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE] 
 
In addition, the correlation between the T to T+3 and T+4 to T+8 returns is negative only for the 
value weighted portfolios of stocks in the six highest deciles of mutual fund ownership. All these 
pieces of evidence suggest that mutual funds, and other institutions with a month-end payment cycle, 
are a major force in the turn of the month phenomenon. It is therefore possible that the increase in 
the size of the mutual fund industry is an important factor contributing to the fact that the turn of the 
month return patterns, including the return reversals around the turn of the month, have become if 
anything more pronounced over the years. In what follows, we present some additional evidence to 
support this hypothesis. 
 
Figure 6 displays the correlations of T-8 to T-4 returns and the T-3 to T-1 returns for different equity 
indices across countries along with the percentage of the market capitalization that is held by mutual 
funds within each country. It seems that the return reversals around T-3 are indeed larger in countries 
where mutual funds are more prevalent. Using regression analysis we confirm that this negative 
relationship between mutual fund ownership and the degree of market return reversal around T-3 is 
statistically significant at a 1% level (results are available upon request).   
 
[INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE] 
 
Finally we use regression analysis to study if there is a time-series relation between the return 
reversals around T-3 and the size of the US mutual fund industry. Our results, presented in Table 5, 
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show that indeed the size of the mutual fund industry (normalized by stock market capitalization) 
statistically significantly affects the degree of market return reversal around T-3 (this is observable 
from the coefficient of the interaction term where the size of the mutual fund industry is interacted 
with the T-8 to T-4 returns). The result holds for both a value weighted stock index of the US market 
as well as for the S&P 500 index. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
5.3. Other evidence that mutual funds affect the turn of the month patterns 
To further investigate the reasons why return patterns at the turn of the month may be related to 
mutual fund ownership, we turn to the agency relationship between the mutual fund manager and the 
end investor. Because of this agency relationship, mutual fund managers might become unwilling to 
take risk near the month end due to the monthly reporting cycle in mutual funds. For instance, to 
avoid the risk of having to report excessively poor returns that might spark outflows (see e.g. Sirri 
and Tufano, 1998). Given such agency problems, it is plausible that mutual funds’ willingness to 
take risk is decreased as the month goes by. This unwillingness to take risk may lead to additional 
selling pressure prior to T-3, and it may explain why those funds that do not have month end 
liquidity needs do not agree to trade against the liquidity based sellers prior to T-3. 
 
Our evidence presented in Table 6 and Figure 7 support this idea of month-end risk reduction. In 
Table 6, we show that the average betas of mutual funds are abnormally low from T-5 to T-3. As 
discussed, this result can arise from the average mutual fund’s need to sell assets prior to T-3 to meet 
its month-end cash demands, or it can be a reflection of funds willingness to take less risk near the 
end of the month. The finding in Figure 7 that mutual funds’ volatility decreases as the month goes 
by can also be linked to either the average fund’s willingness to take less risk or its tendency to 
accumulate cash to meet its payments near the month end. Irrespective of which one of these two 
forces affects more the mutual funds’ behavior near the month end, such behavioral patterns can 
contribute to the predictability of stock market returns around T-3 that we documented in Section 3. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 AND FIGURE 7 HERE] 
 
5.4 The effect of stock characteristics on the turn of the month returns 
If the behavior of sophisticated investors is indeed inducing patterns in the turn of the month stock 
returns, these investors should at least be trying their best to avoid it. That is, any month-end 
liquidity needs should be met with sales of liquid stocks, with minimal price impact and transaction 
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costs. To investigate this hypothesis, we sort the stocks in the CRSP universe based on different 
characteristics that could be associated with transaction costs. The results are shown in Table 7.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
 
Consistent with the idea that mutual funds seek to meet their liquidity needs with minimal 
transaction costs, we find that the correlation between T-8 to T-4 and T-3 to T-1 returns is most 
negative for the most liquid, large cap stocks. Similarly, the return reversals around T+3 are only 
significant for the largest and most liquid stocks.17  
 
Furthermore, if the patterns we observe are in part due to mutual funds’ eagerness to reduce risk near 
the month end, they should do so by reducing their holdings of risky but liquid stocks. We 
investigate this idea in Table 8, which reports returns and correlations around the month end within 
quartiles of stocks sorted by volatility, controlling for liquidity. Consistent with our intuition, we find 
that return reversals around T-3 are most pronounced for the most volatile, yet liquid stocks.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
	  
6. Mutual fund alphas and their exposure to the turn of the month 
returns? 
In this section we show that mutual funds seem to suffer from their exposure to the return reversals 
around T-3 (presumably evidencing their tendency to sell prior to T-3). If we sort the mutual funds 
by the two year average correlation in their T-8 to T-4 returns and their T-3 to T-1 returns, we find 
that the funds in the two highest correlation deciles have a significantly positive four factor alpha, 
while the alpha is negative for all the other funds. The alphas are presented in Figure 8. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 8 HERE] 	  
Double sorting these returns with the funds’ historical two-year flow volatility reveals that the 
differences across correlation deciles are larger for the funds with high flow volatility (the results are 
available from the authors upon request). In other unreported tests (also available from the authors 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 For smaller and less liquid stocks return correlations between T to T+3 and T+4 to T+8 are positive. This 
suggests that the institutions purchasing the least liquid stocks in the beginning of the month make their 
purchases gradually, continuing past the first three days of the month. Thus, again, they appear to operate 
conscious of transaction costs. Previously, a different linkage between liquidity and the turn of the month 
returns has been studied in Booth, Kallunki and Martikainen (2001). They present evidence that stocks’ 
liquidity increases after the turn of the month, possibly contributing to the positive returns after the turn of the 
month. 
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upon request) we find that the mutual fund four factor alphas rise linearly in the funds’ past two 
years’ average returns on either the dates T-8 to T-4 or T+4 to T+8, suggesting also that the funds 
selling prior to the turn of the month and their buying at the beginning of the month affects 
negatively their alphas.   
	  
7. Hedge Funds and Funding Constraints 
7.1 Do hedge funds mitigate turn of the month return reversals? 
In this section we investigate the behavior of hedge funds near the month end, looking for evidence 
on hedge funds’ ability to mitigate the predictable patterns in market returns. Our evidence on this is 
mixed at best. First, in Table 9, we show that the average market beta of hedge funds near the month 
end behaves similarly to the average beta of mutual funds. This suggests that hedge funds do not 
provide liquidity to those mutual funds that sell to reduce their risks near the month end, as one 
might have expected. In case of hedge funds, the month end patterns in betas may be related not only 
to their concerns related to their own monthly return reporting cycles, but also to the fact that their 
infrequent subscription and redemption times are commonly set at the ends of calendar months. This 
further increases their concerns about their returns near the end of the month, and it leads to a 
vigorous month end cash cycle in hedge funds. Supporting the latter reason for the time variation in 
hedge funds’ market betas, we find that the patterns in hedge fund betas are more pronounced for 
those funds with less frequent redemption periods (and presumably larger in- and outflows at times 
of subscription and redemption). Therefore, it appears that cash cycle constraints and concerns 
related to fund flows affects the hedge funds’ ability and willingness to take risk around the turn of 
the month very much in the same way as they affected the mutual funds.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
 
If neither hedge funds nor mutual funds can or want to take risk near the month end, we would 
expect the stock market turnover to decrease also. We confirm this intuition in Figure 9; trading 
volume is substantially lower during the last few trading days of the month than on average on other 
days.18 
  
[INSERT FIGURE 9 HERE] 
 
While the hedge fund industry in aggregate does not seem to accommodate market-wide selling 
pressure near the month end, it is possible that a subset of hedge funds do so. Indeed, we study the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 More detailed analysis reveals evidence that the drop in the trading volume between T-4 to T-1 is larger for 
the half of the stocks that are more commonly held by mutual funds.  
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behavior of different hedge fund strategies and find that Managed Futures and Global Macro funds 
have abnormally large positive exposures to the market on day T-3 (see Table 10). This suggests that 
at least some hedge funds do provide liquidity prior to T-3, counterbalancing the selling pressure 
from other institutions. The evidence regarding liquidity supply around T-3 is especially strong for 
the Managed Futures funds that have significantly positive excess betas also on days T-4 and T-5.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 10 HERE] 
 
7.2. Funding Constraints and turn of the month returns 
We find evidence, reported in Table 11, that high TED-spread significantly increases the return 
reversals around T-3 (this is observable from the coefficient of the interaction term where TED-
spread is interacted with the T-8 to T-4 returns). This result provides evidence that funding 
constraints for the institutional investors are an important cause behind the return reversals around T-
3. It seems that when institutions have good access to the debt capital markets (as proxied by low 
TED spread) they rely less on selling and buying of stocks to manage their turn of the month 
liquidity needs. 
 
TED-spread is commonly used as a proxy for especially the hedge funds’ funding liquidity (see e.g. 
Brunnermeier, Nagel and Pedersen (2009)). Therefore let us investigate the idea if the TED-spread 
affects the return reversals primarily via the hedge funds, by considering a related variable “hedge 
funds’ cost of leverage,” which is a variable where the TED-spread is multiplied with the hedge 
funds’ AUM (scaled by the market capitalization of the US stocks). We find that the interaction of 
hedge funds’ cost of leverage and the return from T-8 to T-4 is a statistically significant predictor of 
the returns from T-3 to T-1, but only slightly more significant than the TED-spread interaction term 
alone. These findings provide evidence that when TED spread is low, at least hedge funds (but 
possibly other institutions as well) are better able to counterbalance month-end selling pressure using 
leverage. The results are reported in Table 11.  
   
[INSERT TABLE 11 HERE] 
 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper, we attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of month-end equity return patterns 
and tie them to the literature on limits of arbitrage. We are the first to document a strong market 
return reversal around the most common last settlement day of the month, T-3, which guarantees 
cash for month-end distributions. This return reversal exists both in the time series of US stock index 
returns, in the cross-section of US stock returns and in the time series of most of the developed 
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markets’ stock indices. We argue that the reversal is caused mainly by the month-end cash cycle – 
which, as previously argued by Odgen (1990), is also the likely cause of the abnormally high returns 
on the last and on the first three trading days of the month. Our findings support the idea that both 
the return reversal after the selling pressure that precedes T-3 and the beginning of the month buying 
pressure in combination lead to the exceptionally high returns during the seven days around the turn 
of the month.  
 
To shed some light on the underlying market dynamics, we present extensive evidence that links the 
return reversals around T-3 to institutional investors’ and in particular the mutual funds’ trading, and 
their reduced willingness to take risks near the month end. For example, within the cross-section of 
individual stocks, we show that the turn of the month return reversals are more pronounced among 
stocks that are more commonly held by mutual funds, and stocks that are arguably easier to use for 
cash management, such as large and liquid stocks. Controlling for liquidity, we find that the reversals 
are stronger for more volatile stocks, consistent with the idea that institutional investors seek to 
reduce portfolio risk toward the month end for agency reasons. At an aggregate level, we show that 
the return reversals near the turn of the month have only intensified as mutual funds’ AUM as a 
proportion of the overall stock market has increased. Also in international samples, the return 
reversals seem to be more pronounced in countries with larger mutual fund sectors.  
 
Using data on institutional investors trading we find additional, direct evidence to support the idea 
that institutions’ trading contribute to the turn of the month return predictability. Namely, we find 
that the institutions whose trades are included in the ANcerno data set are on average net sellers prior 
to T-3, but net buyers at the end of the month and on the first few days of the month. This finding, in 
combination with the return patterns around the turn of the month implies that institutions 
(eventually the pensioners and the investors behind the institutions) lose significantly from liquidity 
related trading around the turn of the month. In line with this, we present evidence that the mutual 
funds’ historical return patterns around the turn of the month (which point out to funds’ costs from 
their turn of the month trading) significantly affect their future alphas.  
 
Our results contribute to the academic literature by tying the large existing literature on the turn of 
the month return anomalies to rational models of markets with temporally segmented investors. In 
addition, our findings have significant practical implications for the institutions that currently 
mismanage their turn of the month liquidity related trading. Finally, our findings can contribute to 
the debate about the benefits of the shortening the settlement window in stock trading.  
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Figure 1 
 
Cumulative returns around the turn of the month  
 
This figure shows the cumulative excess returns (Rm-Rf) from investing in the CRSP value weighted 
total return stock index only on days T-3 to T+3 around the turn of the month, where T refers to the 
last day of the month and e.g. T+3 to the third business day of the month. It shows also the returns 
from investing in the same index only on days T-8 to T-4, only on days T+4 to T+8, and only on 
days outside T-8 to T+8. Sample period is from July 1926 to December 2013. Logarithmic scale. 
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Figure 2 
 
Daily returns around the turn of the month 
 
This figure shows the average daily returns on the CRSP value weighted stock index around the turn 
of the month. Day T denotes the last trading day of the month and T-1 the trading day preceding that, 
and so on. The sample period is from January 1980 to the end of 2013.  
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Figure 3 
 
Institutions’ buy ratios around the turn of the month 
 
This figure shows the buy ratios for a sample of US institutions’ around the turn of the month in 
excess of their average buy ratio in our sample. Day T denotes the last trading day of the month and 
T-1 the trading day preceding that, and so on. The buy ratio refers to the number of institutions’ buy 
transactions divided by total number of institutional transactions. Buy ratio USD is the value of the 
institutions’ buy transactions in USD divided by the total value of the institutions’ buy and sell 
transactions. The data is from ANcerno and the sample period is from January 1999 to the end of 
2013. *, ** and *** denote the statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Figure 4A 
 
Pension fund payment dates around the turn of the month 
 
This figure shows the proportion of pension payment dates of the largest US public pension plans 
around the turn of the month. Day T denotes the last trading day of the month and T-1 the trading day 
preceding that, and so on. The data, obtained from Pension & Investment 300 Analysis (2012) by 
Tower Watson and individual pension fund websites, include 15 of the 19 largest US public pension 
plans. An assumption has been made that the most recent reported payment dates have remained the 
same from January 1980 to December 2013. 
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Figure 4B 
 
Mutual fund distributions around the turn of the month 
 
This figure displays mutual funds’ distributions around the turn of the month. Day T denotes the last 
trading day of the month and T-1 the trading day preceding that, and so on. The distributions are 
normalized by the aggregate mutual funds’ assets under management. The sample consists of all the 
funds in the CRSP US Mutual Fund database. The sample period is from January 1980 to December 
2013. The first panel shows the mutual funds’ distributions based on all months and the second panel 
excludes the December observations.  
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Corporate dividend payment dates around the turn of the month 
 
The figure shows the proportion of annual dividend payments (in dollars) by CRSP companies 
occurring around the turn of the month. Day T denotes the last trading day of the month and T-1 the 
trading day preceding that, and so on. The sample period is from January 1980 to December 2013. 	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Figure 5 
 
The effect of mutual fund holdings on the turn of the month patterns 
 
This figure shows value- and equal-weighted returns around the turn of the month in deciles of 
stocks based on our estimates of the mutual funds’ total ownership percentages of stocks in the 
previous month. Our sample consists of all CRSP stocks owned by at least one mutual fund (in 
Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings database). Sample period is from January 1980 until 
December 2013. Panel A documents the returns from T-8 until T-4, Panel B the returns from T-3 to 
T-1, Panel C the returns from T to T+3 and Panel D the returns from T+4 to T+8. Finally, Panel E 
shows the correlation of T-8 to T-4 and T-3 to T-1 returns and Panel F the correlation of T to T+3 and 
T+4 to T+8 returns in different mutual fund ownership deciles. 10 = highest ownership decile.  
 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
29	  	  
Figure 6 
 
Mutual funds’ ownership and the correlation of  
T-8 to T-4 and T-3 to T-1 returns across countries 
 
This figure shows the mutual funds’ domestic stock holdings as a percentage of total market 
capitalization of the country and the correlation of T-8 to T-4 and T-3 to T-1 returns, reprinted from 
Table 2. The stock holdings percentage is an average of annual observations from 2008 until 2012. 
Our sample includes all countries from Table 2 for which the relevant data are available from 
OECD’s Institutional Investor assets database. Total market capitalizations are from World Bank. 
For some countries, only total stock holdings (i.e. holdings including both domestic and foreign 
stock holdings) by mutual funds are available. Out of these countries, we have included USA and 
Japan (denoted with star in the figure) due to their large domestic equity markets. Denmark and 
Ireland, where only the mutual funds’ total stock holdings are available are excluded. Finally, 
Luxembourg is excluded as the domestic stock holdings reported exceed the total market 
capitalization of the Luxembourg stock exchange.  	  
	  
	  	  *	  Includes	  both	  stocks	  issued	  by	  residents	  and	  non-­‐residents	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Figure 7 
 
Mutual funds’ return volatility  
relative to average daily return volatility 
 
This figure shows how mutual funds’ return volatility behaves throughout the month by showing the 
funds’ average volatilities observed during each trading day of the month (T+1 being the first trading 
day of the month), normalized by the funds’ average daily return volatility. The daily mutual fund 
returns are from CRSP. The sample period is from September 1998 until December 2013. Note that 
the number of observations decreases when the number of business days from the start of the month 
increases. 
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Figure 8 
 
Mutual funds’ alphas and fund specific correlations  
between T-8 to T-4 returns and T-3 to T-1 returns  
 
This figure shows the mutual funds’ four factor alphas conditional on the fund specific past two 
years’ correlation between the fund’s T-8 to T-4 and T-3 to T-1 returns. More specifically funds are 
divided into deciles every year (at the end of December) based on this correlation. Four factor alphas 
are calculated using the next year’s daily returns controlling for Fama and French 3-factors and 
Carhart’s Momentum factor. Decile 10 includes mutual funds with the highest correlation in their T-
8 to T-4 and T-3 to T-1 returns. The daily mutual fund returns are from CRSP. The sample period is 
from January 1999 until December 2013.  
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Figure 9 
 
Turnover around the turn of the month 
 
This figure shows the stocks' average daily turnover on days around the turn of the month in excess 
of the average daily turnover outside the turn of the month. Day T denotes the last trading day of the 
month and T-1 the trading day preceding that, and so on. The average daily turnover outside the turn 
of the month refers to the average turnover on days from T+11 of the ending month to T-8 of that 
month, and from T+5 to T+10 of the month that begins. Turnover is estimated as the CRSP total 
trading volume in USD divided by the CRSP total market capitalization of the previous day. Our 
sample period is from January 1980 to December 2013. 	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Table 1  
	  
Annualized returns around the turn of the month	  
	  
This table presents the annualized returns around the turn of the month in G-10 countries as well as 
in several other industrialized countries. T refers to the last trading day of the month. Our sample 
starts in January 1980 or later when the relevant data becomes available, and runs until the end of 
2013 (to be precise, until the 8th trading day of 2014). All figures that statistically significantly differ 
from zero at a 5% significance level are bolded.  
 
Country  Index 
  
Sample 
starts 
Annualized 
return 
T-3 - T-1 
Annualized 
return 
T 
Annualized 
return 
T+1 - T+3 
Annualized 
return 
T-8 - T-4 
Annualized 
return 
T+4 - T+8 
Annualized 
return 
on other 
days 
United States S&P500 Jan-80 27.1% 20.3% 33.1% -3.4% -1.9% 17.5% 
United States CRSP VW Jan-80 27.3% 35.6% 32.4% -4.7% -2.1% 14.6% 
                  
Other G10 countries               
Belgium BEL20 Jan-90 16.1% 50.0% 37.0% -13.0% -6.4% 15.4% 
Canada S&P/TSX C Jan-86 16.6% 58.8% 24.9% -5.0% -1.8% 7.6% 
France CAC40 Jan-88 35.4% 49.2% 33.7% -5.8% -12.2% 14.7% 
Germany DAX Jan-80 14.0% 39.0% 53.2% -8.6% -10.4% 18.4% 
Italy FTSE MIB Jan-98 30.0% 21.9% 21.2% -13.8% -17.7% 15.5% 
Japan NIKKEI225 Jan-80 28.4% 27.6% 18.3% 1.6% -14.0% 2.1% 
Netherlands AEX Jan-83 17.9% 36.4% 45.2% -1.3% -5.7% 19.5% 
Sweden OMXS30 Jan-86 29.6% 39.5% 51.5% -8.1% -0.6% 11.9% 
Switzerland SMI Jul-88 23.0% 27.1% 37.1% -10.4% -1.9% 14.3% 
UK FTSE100 Jan-86 26.6% 23.7% 37.4% -11.7% -0.8% 19.2% 
                  
Other industrialized countries              
Australia S&P/ASX200 Jun-92 29.2% 37.8% 21.3% 2.7% -7.3% 11.4% 
Austria ATX Jan-91 34.3% 43.1% 45.3% 0.2% -15.5% -10.2% 
Denmark OMXC20 Dec-89 18.4% 34.4% 44.3% -14.5% 0.8% 19.0% 
Finland OMXH25 Jan-91 29.7% 81.7% 41.2% -3.5% -4.9% 11.9% 
Hong Kong HSI Jan-80 20.3% 65.8% 39.0% -2.5% 7.9% 28.6% 
Ireland ISEQ OVER Jan-88 8.3% 64.1% 41.5% -6.0% -4.1% 13.6% 
Israel TA-25 Jan-92 19.8% 41.5% 43.6% -0.9% 10.4% -0.1% 
Luxembourg LUXX Jan-99 25.5% 51.7% 21.9% -8.6% 1.1% -7.3% 
New Zealand NZX50 Jan-01 29.8% 63.7% 16.6% -0.5% -10.8% 4.8% 
Norway OBX Jan-87 18.6% 64.3% 42.5% -4.1% -3.7% 12.5% 
Portugal PSI-20 Jan-93 9.6% 17.7% 41.3% -11.2% 6.7% 2.2% 
Singapore STI Sep-99 24.0% 42.2% 37.4% -5.7% 2.3% -19.2% 
South Korea KOSPI Jan-80 3.2% 84.0% 42.2% 1.2% 9.1% -12.7% 
Spain IBEX35 Mar-87 20.5% 38.6% 36.3% -10.4% -1.8% 30.3% 
 
Average of all indexes  22.4% 44.6% 36.1% -5.7% -3.3% 9.8% 	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Table 2  
 
Correlations around the turn of the month 
 
This table presents the correlation of the returns from T-8 to T-4 and T-3 to T-1; as well as the 
correlation of the returns from T to T+3 and T+4 to T+8. Here T refers to the last trading day of the 
month. Our sample period starts in January 1980 or when the relevant data becomes available. The 
sample runs until end of 2013 (to be precise, until the 8th trading day of 2014). All figures that 
statistically significantly differ from zero at a 5% significance level are bolded.  
 
 
 Country  Index 
Sample 
starts 
Correlation of 
T-8 - T-4 and 
T-3 - T-1 
returns 
Correlation of 
T - T+3 and 
T+4 –T+8 
returns 
Daily 
return 
auto- 
correlation 
Weekly 
return 
auto- 
correlation 
United States S&P500 Jan-80 -0.30 -0.09 -0.03 -0.05 
United States CRSP VW Jan-80 -0.32 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 
          	  	   	  	  
Other G10 countries       	  	   	  	  
Belgium BEL20 Jan-90 -0.26 -0.23 0.07 -0.03 
Canada S&P/TSX C Jan-86 -0.30 0.05 0.03 -0.05 
France CAC40 Jan-88 -0.21 -0.20 -0.01 -0.04 
Germany DAX Jan-80 -0.15 -0.15 0.00 -0.02 
Italy FTSE MIB Jan-98 -0.28 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 
Japan NIKKEI225 Jan-80 -0.18 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 
Netherlands AEX Jan-83 -0.18 -0.21 0.00 0.03 
Sweden OMXS30 Jan-86 -0.11 -0.11 0.04 -0.02 
Switzerland SMI Jul-88 -0.17 -0.24 0.03 -0.07 
United Kingdom FTSE100 Jan-86 -0.26 -0.20 0.00 -0.05 
          	  	   	  	  
Other industrialized countries       	  	   	  	  
Australia S&P/ASX200 Jun-92 -0.25 -0.12 -0.01 -0.04 
Austria ATX Jan-91 -0.34 -0.07 0.08 0.01 
Denmark OMXC20 Dec-89 -0.38 -0.02 0.06 -0.05 
Finland OMXH25 Jan-91 -0.01 -0.19 0.04 0.02 
Hong Kong HSI Jan-80 -0.19 -0.04 0.03 0.08 
Ireland ISEQ OVER Jan-88 -0.11 -0.25 0.07 0.00 
Israel TA-25 Jan-92 -0.13 -0.08 0.02 -0.07 
Luxembourg LUXX Jan-99 -0.23 -0.14 0.07 0.07 
New Zealand NZX50 Jan-01 -0.03 0.05 0.05 0.04 
Norway OBX Jan-87 -0.23 -0.10 0.03 0.02 
Portugal PSI-20 Jan-93 -0.09 -0.15 0.11 0.07 
Singapore STI Sep-99 -0.35 -0.06 0.03 0.03 
South Korea KOSPI Jan-80 -0.23 -0.07 0.06 -0.07 
Spain IBEX35 Mar-87 -0.04 -0.20 0.05 -0.02 
 
Average of all indexes  -­‐0.20 -­‐0.11 0.03 -­‐0.01 
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Table 3 
 
The effect of institutional trading on the market returns  
from T-3 to T-1 
 
This table shows the results from a regression in which the US equity market index returns from T-3 
to T-1 are regressed on the T-8 to T-4 returns to the same index, and on the institutional investors’ 
cumulative selling pressure from T-5 to T-4. Here T refers to the last trading day of the month. 
Institutional investors’ selling pressure is defined to be the difference between the value of their 
stock sales and purchases (normalized by the US total stock market capitalization at time T-6) when 
the sales exceed the purchases, and to be zero otherwise. Our institutional investors’ trade data is 
from ANcerno and the sample period is from January 1999 to December 2013. The returns in the 
first, third and fifth column are those of the CRSP value-weighted index, while in the second, fourth 
and sixth column they are those of the S&P 500 index. T-statistics based on Newey-West standard 
errors are shown below the coefficients. All figures that statistically significantly differ from zero at 
a 5% significance level are bolded. 
 
 
y = returns T-3 – T-1 
 
 
   Market return T-8 - T-4 -0.352 -0.333 
  
-0.344 -0.326 
  (-2.68) (-2.60)   (-2.89) (-2.79) 
 
   Institutional investors’    117.25 113.51 111.09 108.53 
   sell pressure   (2.42) (2.45) (3.34) (3.23) 
 
   Intercept 0.003 0.003 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
  (2.29) (1.88) (-0.09) (-0.27) (-0.53) (-0.81) 
 
   R2 0.184 0.163 0.084 0.084 0.259 0.240 
 
   Index CRSP VW S&P 500 CRSP VW S&P 500 CRSP VW S&P 500 
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Table 4 
 
Cross-sectional return reversal around the turn of the month 
 
Panel A shows evidence of cross-sectional return reversals around the turn of the month by showing the 
returns from T–3 to T–1 and from T to T+3 for the deciles of stocks based on their T-8 to T-4 returns. 
Here T refers to the last trading day of the month. In Panel B, the table shows the stocks’ returns from 
T+4 to T+8 in the deciles of stocks based on their T to T+3 returns. Our sample includes all US stocks 
in CRSP that have a share price above USD 5, and a market capitalization that exceeds the NYSE 10th 
market capitalization percentile on the 10th trading day of the corresponding month. The sample period 
is from January 1980 until December 2013. The last column shows the difference in the returns between 
the two extreme deciles. T-statistics are provided in the parenthesis. All figures that statistically 
significantly differ from zero at a 5% significance level are bolded. 
 
 
A: Deciles based on returns from T-8 to T-4 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1-10 
 
Return 0.92% 0.54% 0.43% 0.39% 0.37% 0.34% 0.33% 0.31% 0.27% 0.09% 0.84% 
T-3 - T-1 (5.79) (4.37) (3.91) (3.94) (4.00) (3.79) (3.65) (3.41) (2.83) (0.75) (8.14) 
  
Return 0.98% 0.80% 0.73% 0.64% 0.61% 0.59% 0.59% 0.54% 0.56% 0.49% 0.49% 
T - T+3  (5.28) (5.57) (5.85) (5.71) (5.66) (5.64) (5.63) (4.93) (4.74) (3.36) (4.33) 
                        
 
 
 
 
B: Deciles based on returns from T to T+3 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1-10 
Return  0.38% 0.08% 0.03% 0.00% 0.03% 0.01% 0.03% -0.01% -0.09% -0.37% 0.75% 
T+4 - T+8 (2.07) (0.55) (0.23) (0.03) (0.21) (0.11) (0.23) (-0.06) (-0.67) (-2.29) (7.19) 
 
	    
37	  	  
Table 5 
 
The effect of mutual funds on the turn of the month patterns 
 
This table shows the results from a regression in which the US equity market index returns from T-3 
to T-1 are regressed on the T-8 to T-4 returns to the same index, and on the mutual fund industry’s 
assets under management, and its interaction with the T-8 to T-4 index returns. Here T refers to the 
last trading day of the month. Mutual fund industry assets under management is the sum of all equity 
mutual funds’ assets under management based on the CRSP mutual fund database, normalized by the 
US total stock market capitalization. The returns in the first and the third column are those for the 
CRSP value-weighted index, while in the second and the fourth column they are those for the S&P 
500 index. T-statistics based on Newey-West standard errors are shown below the coefficients. All 
figures that statistically significantly differ from zero at a 5% significance level are bolded. 
	  
	  
y = returns T-3 - T-1         
 
Market return T-8 - T-4 -0.255 -0.241 0.535 0.477 
  (-2.63) (-2.72) (1.99) (1.79) 
 
Mutual fund industry AUM   -0.002 -0.006 
    (-0.17) (-0.44) 
Interaction of mutual fund industry 
AUM and market return T-8 - T-4  
  
 
-3.289 -3.076 
  (-2.43) (-2.31) 
 
Intercept 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005 
  (3.69) (3.65) (1.38) (1.52) 
 
R2 0.102 0.088 0.184 0.170 
 
Index CRSP VW S&P 500 CRSP VW S&P 500 
 
 
Sample 
1/1980-
12/2013 
1/1980-
12/2013 
2/1991-
4/2013 
2/1991-
4/2013 
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Table 6 
 
Mutual funds’ market betas around the turn of the month 
 
This table shows mutual funds’ average market betas on various days around the turn of the month 
relative to their market betas on all other days. The average market betas are obtained from fund 
specific regressions where mutual funds’ daily returns are regressed on daily S&P 500 index returns, 
dummies for days corresponding to their location relative to the turn of the month, and their 
interactions. In the second column, the days T and T+1 are pooled as there is evidence of abnormally 
significant return reversal (potentially due to window dressing) following the last day of the month 
that otherwise biases downwards the estimates of the daily betas for those days. Here T refers to the 
last trading day of the month. The mutual funds’ daily returns are from the CRSP mutual fund 
database. The sample period is from September 1998 to December 2013. All figures that statistically 
significantly differ from zero at a 5% significance level are bolded. 	  
	  	   	  	   	   	   	  	   	  	  
    Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
  T-5 -0.019 (-12.54) -0.019 (-12.53) 
  T-4 -0.026 (-15.41) -0.026 (-15.51) 
Interactions of 
time period 
dummies and 
daily S&P500 
returns 
T-3 -0.056 (-36.43) -0.056 (-36.58) 
T-2 -0.001 (-0.79) -0.002 (-0.84) 
T-1 -0.004 (-3.03) -0.004 (-3.31) 
T -0.076 (-54.38) 0.000 (0.05) 
T+1 0.006 (1.74) 
T+2 0.040 (18.24) 0.039 (18.23) 
T+3 0.019 (9.00) 0.019 (8.99) 
  T+4 -0.008 (-5.51) -0.008 (-5.52) 
  T+5 -0.029 (14.17) -0.029 (-14.41) 
 
Daily S&P500 return  0.836 (181.40) 0.837 (183.51) 
Intercept   0.000 (-12.37) 0.000 (-12.38) 
Time period dummies Yes   Yes   
Number of funds 6715   6709   
          	  	  
	   	  
39	  	  
Table 7 
 
Liquidity, size and return reversals around the turn of the month 
 
A. This table shows the effect of liquidity on the turn of the month return patterns. Our sample, 
covering data from January 1980 to December 2013, includes all stocks in CRSP listed in the 
NYSE and the Amex, that have share price above USD 5 on the 10th trading day of 
corresponding month and a market capitalization that exceeds the NYSE 10th market 
capitalization percentile. Amihud (2002) ILLIQ measure is calculated as a rolling one year 
average until the 10th trading day of corresponding month. For stocks sorted into deciles based 
on their Amihud measure (10th being the most illiquid), the table shows the annualized value-
weighted returns on the relevant dates, and the correlations between T-8 to T-4 and T-3 to T-1 
returns and T to T+3 and T+4 to T+8 returns, respectively. Here T refers to the last trading day 
of the month. All figures that statistically significantly differ from zero at a 5% significance 
level are bolded. 	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Amihud 
Decile 
Annualized 
return          
T-3 - T-1 
Annualized 
return          
T 
Annualized 
return          
T+1 - T+3 
Annualized 
return          
T-8 - T-4 
Annualized 
return 
 T+4 - T+8 
Annualized 
return on 
other days 
Correlation of 
T-8 - T-4 and 
T-3 - T-1 
returns 
Correlation of 
T - T+3 and 
T+4 - T+8 
returns 
1 27.5% 13.4% 31.6% -3.9% -1.3% 17.1% -0.29 -0.10 
2 32.4% 46.2% 32.4% -5.4% -3.3% 16.0% -0.29 -0.04 
3 34.8% 53.6% 35.1% -8.2% -3.0% 18.2% -0.29 -0.03 
4 35.2% 60.8% 31.4% -10.4% -0.6% 18.4% -0.28 0.04 
5 37.4% 65.5% 33.2% -8.9% -1.2% 14.0% -0.28 0.03 
6 40.1% 73.7% 32.6% -9.3% -1.6% 15.1% -0.28 0.02 
7 32.7% 72.9% 32.4% -9.0% 0.8% 11.6% -0.23 0.07 
8 35.6% 76.2% 28.6% -8.1% 2.7% 14.5% -0.26 0.08 
9 33.7% 76.4% 31.0% -5.5% 3.6% 15.1% -0.24 0.07 
10 30.3% 72.7% 31.9% -2.1% 3.9% 9.6% -0.18 0.10 
Average 34.0% 61.1% 32.0% -7.1% 0.0% 14.9% -0.26 0.02 
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B. This table shows the effect of market capitalization on the turn of month patterns. Our sample, 
covering data from January 1980 to December 2013, includes all stocks from CRSP that have a 
share price above USD 5 on the 10th trading day of corresponding month and a market 
capitalization that exceeds the NYSE 10th market capitalization percentile. For stocks sorted 
into deciles based on their market capitalization (10th being the largest), the table shows the 
annualized value-weighted average returns on the relevant dates, and the correlations between 
the corresponding T-8 to T-4 and T-3 to T-1 returns and T to T+3 and T+4 to T+8 returns, 
respectively. Here T refers to the last trading day of the month. All figures that statistically 
significantly differ from zero at a 5% significance level are bolded. 
 
	  
Size 
Decile 
Annualized 
return          
T-3 - T-1 
Annualized 
return          
T 
Annualized 
return          
T+1 - T+3 
Annualized 
return          
T-8 - T-4 
Annualized 
return 
T+4 - T+8 
Annualized 
return on 
other days 
Correlation of 
T-8 - T-4 and 
T-3 - T-1 
returns 
Correlation of 
T - T+3 and 
T+4 - T+8 
returns 
1 25.8% 77.0% 19.6% -4.1% 2.8% 10.1% -0.18 0.11 
2 27.6% 76.7% 22.5% -6.5% 2.7% 11.9% -0.16 0.12 
3 32.1% 84.7% 25.1% -7.9% 1.3% 9.1% -0.16 0.13 
4 33.5% 76.2% 25.3% -5.9% 0.6% 11.5% -0.18 0.12 
5 31.1% 73.1% 29.8% -8.2% 0.3% 11.1% -0.17 0.08 
6 35.2% 75.0% 31.1% -10.7% 1.0% 12.1% -0.21 0.05 
7 34.6% 73.1% 33.9% -9.8% -1.0% 13.0% -0.22 0.03 
8 34.6% 60.8% 35.9% -9.7% -0.8% 14.0% -0.28 0.04 
9 32.2% 56.4% 35.2% -8.1% -1.8% 14.0% -0.28 -0.01 
10 26.5% 18.0% 33.4% -3.5% -2.1% 17.1% -0.29 -0.08 
Average 31.3% 67.1% 29.2% -7.4% 0.3% 12.4% -0.21 0.06 
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Table 8  
 
The effect of volatility on the turn of the month patterns 
 
This table shows the effect of the stocks’ past 6-month return volatility on their turn of month 
patterns. To control for the fact that liquidity and volatility are correlated we condition our 
volatility estimates on liquidity. Our sample, covering data from 1980 to 2013, includes all stocks 
in CRSP listed in NYSE and Amex that have share price above USD 5 on the 10th trading day of 
corresponding month, and a market capitalization that exceeds the NYSE 10th market capitalization 
percentile. Amihud (2002) ILLIQ measure is calculated as a rolling one year average until the 10th 
trading day of corresponding month. Stocks fulfilling the requirements stated above are first 
dividend into Amihud-illiquidity quartiles; quartile 1(4) denoting the most liquid (illiquid) stocks. 
Then every Amihud-illiquidity quartile is divided into volatility quartiles; quartile 1 (4) denoting 
the least (most) volatile stocks within the Amihud-illiquidity quartile. The reported results relate to 
the value-weighted returns of the Amihud-Volatility sorted portfolios. All figures that statistically 
significantly differ from zero at a 5% significance level are bolded. Here T refers to the last trading 
day of the month. 	  
	  	   	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Amihud Volatility 
Annualized 
return         
T-3 - T-1 
Annualized 
return          
T 
Annualized 
return          
T+1 - T+3 
Annualized 
return          
T-8 - T-4 
Annualized 
return 
T+4 - T+8 
Annualized 
return on 
other days 
Correlation of 
T-8 - T-4 and 
T-3 - T-1 
returns 
Correlation of 
T - T+3 and 
T+4 - T+8 
returns 
1 1 23.1% 15.0% 25.2% -1.4% 1.3% 18.1% -0.18 -0.12 
1 2 33.9% 16.0% 30.8% -2.7% 0.0% 20.9% -0.24 -0.09 
1 3 31.7% 24.7% 35.7% -6.5% -3.0% 14.8% -0.33 -0.02 
1 4 30.5% 41.6% 41.2% -10.2% -8.4% 8.4% -0.40 -0.04 
2 1 32.7% 47.1% 29.5% -3.2% 1.3% 20.4% -0.22 0.07 
2 2 36.2% 61.8% 29.6% -7.5% -0.9% 19.1% -0.24 0.05 
2 3 38.0% 67.5% 34.9% -11.0% -3.8% 16.5% -0.30 0.03 
2 4 41.2% 73.7% 38.4% -17.8% -4.5% 13.6% -0.33 -0.01 
3 1 31.5% 52.6% 30.2% -1.6% 2.0% 16.0% -0.23 0.07 
3 2 36.7% 65.4% 30.4% -10.0% 3.0% 18.6% -0.26 0.06 
3 3 43.5% 83.1% 33.1% -11.8% -3.1% 11.9% -0.25 0.04 
3 4 37.7% 105.1% 35.1% -16.7% -7.4% 4.1% -0.29 0.06 
4 1 25.2% 53.3% 27.4% 0.5% 7.8% 17.6% -0.17 0.14 
4 2 36.6% 68.1% 28.9% -3.6% 5.4% 16.7% -0.24 0.09 
4 3 32.2% 91.9% 30.4% -6.7% 1.9% 17.1% -0.27 0.06 
4 4 42.8% 100.0% 30.0% -10.3% -0.2% 2.3% -0.21 0.06 
Average	   34.6% 60.4% 31.9% -7.5% -0.5% 14.7% -0.26 0.03 
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Table 9  
 
Hedge funds’ excess market betas and redemption frequencies 
 
This table shows the hedge funds’ average excess market betas around the turn of the month and the 
hedge funds’ average excess market betas depending on the hedge funds’ redemption frequency (we 
have excluded all categories with less than 200 observations). Hedge funds’ market betas are based 
on fund-specific regressions in which hedge fund’s (monthly) return is regressed on daily S&P 500 
returns around the turn of the month and the return on the S&P500 index outside the turn of the 
month period. Excess market betas are calculated as a difference of the fund’s estimated beta for any 
given day and its beta for the outside the turn of the month period. Hedge fund data is from TASS 
and our sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013. T-statistics are shown below the 
coefficients. All figures that statistically significantly differ from zero at a 5% significance level are 
bolded. Here T refers to the last trading day of the month. 
 
  All funds Monthly Quarterly 
Semi-
Annually Annually 
T-5 -0.110 -0.123 -0.110 -0.039 -0.103 
  (-15.43) (-11.60) (-9.32) (-0.99) (-4.04) 
T-4 -0.089 -0.081 -0.118 -0.092 -0.113 
  (-12.04) (-7.54) (-10.43) (-1.78) (-3.65) 
T-3 -0.017 0.012 -0.058 -0.121 -0.112 
  (-2.54) (1.22) (-5.61) (-2.87) (-3.40) 
T-2 -0.088 -0.097 -0.083 -0.057 -0.010 
  (-13.26) (-9.96) (-8.27) (-1.23) (-0.39) 
T-1 -0.061 -0.041 -0.065 -0.097 -0.132 
  (-10.46) (-5.05) (-7.28) (-2.37) (-5.28) 
T -0.176 -0.173 -0.176 -0.121 -0.093 
  (-21.86) (-14.81) (-12.98) (-2.54) (-2.98) 
T+1 0.142 0.134 0.171 0.112 0.163 
  (21.64) (14.56) (16.35) (2.85) (7.11) 
T+2 0.250 0.227 0.260 0.355 0.348 
  (32.86) (20.42) (22.47) (6.58) (10.32) 
T+3 0.164 0.141 0.188 0.241 0.238 
  (24.01) (13.78) (17.81) (5.26) (7.74) 
T+4 0.106 0.079 0.145 0.125 0.121 
  (16.04) (8.73) (12.65) (2.96) (3.36) 
T+5 0.038 0.017 0.071 0.091 0.146 
  (4.89) (1.54) (5.85) (2.10) (3.55) 
Average T-5 - T-3 -0.072 -0.064 -0.095 -0.084 -0.109 
Average T-2 - T+5 0.047 0.036 0.064 0.081 0.097 
Difference in averages 0.119 0.100 0.159 0.165 0.207 
N 7,810 3,817 2,714 208 322 
	   	  
43	  	  
Table 10 
 
Hedge funds’ excess market betas and style 
 
This table shows the hedge funds’ average excess market betas around the turn of the month in 
certain hedge fund style categories. Hedge funds’ average excess market betas are based on fund-
specific regressions in which hedge fund’s (monthly) return is regressed on the daily S&P 500 
returns around the turn of the month and the return on the S&P500 index outside the turn of the 
month period. Excess market betas for any given fund are calculated as a difference of its estimated 
beta for any given day and its beta outside the turn of the month period. Hedge fund data is from 
TASS and our sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013. T-statistics are shown below 
the coefficients. All figures that statistically significantly differ from zero at a 5% significance level 
are bolded.	  Here T refers to the last trading day of the month. 
 
 
  Global 
Macro 
Managed 
Futures Other styles   
T-5 -0.024 0.147 -0.134 
  (-0.62) (3.85) (-18.66) 
T-4 -0.077 0.102 -0.104 
  (-1.63) (2.35) (-14.40) 
T-3 0.106 0.424 -0.057 
  (2.36) (9.95) (-8.94) 
T-2 -0.062 -0.052 -0.092 
  (-1.88) (-1.49) (-13.56) 
T-1 0.091 -0.065 -0.068 
  (2.35) (-1.77) (-12.01) 
T -0.143 -0.092 -0.185 
  (-3.03) (-2.14) (-22.61) 
T+1 0.052 0.191 0.142 
  (1.39) (4.74) (22.06) 
T+2 0.066 0.213 0.261 
  (1.42) (5.44) (33.99) 
T+3 0.100 0.089 0.173 
  (2.21) (2.14) (25.98) 
T+4 0.044 -0.053 0.121 
  (1.09) (-1.40) (18.54) 
T+5 -0.025 -0.046 0.047 
  (-0.67) (-0.93) (6.19) 
Average T-5 - T-3 0.001 0.224 -0.098 
Average T-2 - T+5 0.016 0.023 0.050 
Difference in averages 0.014 -0.201 0.148 
N 314 538 6,958 	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Table 11 
 
Funding conditions and the turn of the month returns 
 
This table shows the results from a regression in which the T-3 to T-1 stock market returns are 
regressed on the T-8 to T-4 market returns, a measure of cost of leverage, and its interaction with the 
T-8 to T-4 returns. In the first two columns cost of leverage is measured with the TED spread (the 
difference between the 3-month Eurodollar and the Treasury rates). In the third and fourth column 
we modify the cost of leverage measure by multiplying the TED spread by the hedge fund industry’s 
assets under management and call this Hedge Funds’ Cost of Leverage. Hedge funds’ assets under 
management is the sum of all hedge funds’ assets under management based on TASS database 
divided by US stock market capitalization. The returns in the first and the third column are those of 
the CRSP value-weighted index, while in the second and the fourth column they are those of the 
S&P 500 index. T-statistics based on Newey-West standard errors are shown below the coefficients. 
All figures that statistically significantly differ from zero at a 5% significance level are bolded. Here 
T refers to the last trading day of the month. 
 
 
y = Return T-3 - T-1 
 
  
    
Return T-8 - T-4 
 
-0.068 
 
-0.072 
 
-0.075 -0.082 
  (-1.17) (-1.24) (-1.36) (-1.44) 
Cost of Leverage 0.004 0.004   
  (1.37) (1.24)   
     
Interaction of TED spread 
and the T-8 - T-4 return   
-0.148 -0.152   
(-5.79) (-5.68)   
     
Hedge funds’ Cost of 
Leverage  
  0.020 0.015 
  (0.69) (0.53) 
     
Interaction of hedge funds’ 
Cost of Leverage and the 
T-8 - T-4 return  
  -1.566 -1.628 
  (-5.96) (-5.93) 
     
Intercept 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.002 
  (1.15) (1.07) (2.25) (2.12) 
 
R2 0.273 0.254 0.283 0.263 
Index CRSP VW S&P 500 CRSP VW S&P 500 
Sample 
2/1991-
12/2013 
2/1991-
12/2013 
2/1991-
12/2013 
2/1991-
12/2013 	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APPENDIX 
	  
Figure A1 
 
Deposits around the turn of the month 
 
This figure shows the deposits in US Commercial banks relative to their two month average 
surrounding the observation date, on various trading days around the turn of the month. Here day T is 
the last day of the month. The sample period is from January 1980 to December 2013.Data source: 
FRED database. 	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Table A1 
 
Return patterns around the 15th (calendar) day of the month 
 
Let S refers to the last trading day of the month that equals or follows the 15th calendar day of the 
month. This table presents annualized returns around the day S in G-10 countries as well as in 
several other industrialized countries. In addition, the table presents the correlation of the returns 
from S-8 to S-4 and S-3 to S-1; as well as the correlation of the returns from S to S+3 and S+4 to 
S+8. Our sample starts in January 1980 or later when the relevant data becomes available, and runs 
until the end of 2013. All figures that statistically significantly differ from zero at a 5% significance 
level are bolded.  	  
    
Sample 
starts 
Annualized 
return 
S-3 - S-1 
Annualized 
return 
S 
Annualized 
return 
S+1 - S+3 
Annualized 
return 
S-8 - S-4 
Annualized 
return 
S+4 - S+8 
Correlation of 
S-8 - S-4 and 
S-3 - S-1 
returns 
Correlation of 
S - S+3 and 
S+4 - S+8 
returns 
    
Country Index 
United States S&P500 Jan-80 18.7% 3.5% 11.4% 1.6% 7.0% -0.17 -0.04 
United States CRSP VW Jan-80 16.6% 1.1% 7.9% 2.0% 7.1% -0.16 -0.01 
                    
Other G10 countries                 
Belgium BEL20 Jan-90 5.5% 8.6% 5.1% 4.4% -7.6% -0.11 0.09 
Canada S&P/TSX C Jan-86 1.3% -3.6% 7.4% 3.7% 5.9% -0.10 -0.02 
France CAC40 Jan-88 -5.8% 1.9% 3.1% 7.8% 4.0% -0.15 -0.01 
Germany DAX Jan-80 2.4% 13.6% 14.5% 11.4% -4.3% -0.12 0.04 
Italy FTSE MIB Jan-98 9.1% -25.2% 12.7% -9.2% -5.1% -0.28 0.06 
Japan NIKKEI225 Jan-80 -11.1% 35.3% -4.3% 3.9% 6.5% -0.10 0.03 
Netherlands AEX Jan-83 2.1% 16.4% 12.2% 12.7% 1.5% -0.17 0.10 
Sweden OMXS30 Jan-86 6.3% -4.2% 8.8% 17.7% 6.4% -0.16 0.00 
Switzerland SMI Jul-88 3.2% 6.6% 2.2% 11.0% -1.7% -0.17 0.10 
United 
Kingdom FTSE100 Jan-86 0.8% 5.3% 7.8% 11.2% -1.1% -0.19 0.10 
                    
Other industrialized countries                 
Australia S&P/ASX200 Jun-92 -5.6% 16.6% 8.1% 0.7% 9.9% -0.02 -0.01 
Austria ATX Jan-91 -13.9% -13.8% 8.4% 9.6% 7.5% -0.12 -0.03 
Denmark OMXC20 Dec-89 9.2% 11.2% 6.1% 8.5% -6.6% -0.10 0.05 
Finland OMXH25 Jan-91 -5.1% -4.7% 23.2% 17.2% 7.8% -0.11 -0.05 
Hong Kong HSI Jan-80 4.8% 38.2% 4.6% 20.9% 8.5% 0.00 0.10 
Ireland ISEQ OVER Jan-88 -10.8% 8.1% 16.6% 12.4% -4.3% -0.13 0.03 
Israel TA-25 Jan-92 -9.2% 37.7% 13.1% 23.3% 5.9% -0.02 -0.15 
Luxembourg LUXX Jan-99 -1.2% -20.0% -4.3% -1.5% 1.6% -0.05 0.04 
New Zealand NZX50 Jan-01 -3.1% -1.7% 4.4% 0.9% 10.0% -0.02 0.01 
Norway OBX Jan-87 7.1% -0.3% -0.5% 5.6% 7.0% -0.12 -0.04 
Portugal PSI-20 Jan-93 0.6% -13.0% 3.1% 22.8% -9.9% -0.03 0.03 
Singapore STI Sep-99 -1.8% -17.3% -22.6% 7.9% 3.1% 0.05 0.18 
South Korea KOSPI Jan-80 -0.6% -2.9% -2.6% 19.7% -7.4% -0.12 0.03 
Spain IBEX35 Mar-87 8.7% -2.9% 19.8% 16.3% -7.5% -0.11 0.07 
Average of all indexes    1.1% 3.6% 6.4% 9.3% 1.7% -0.11 0.03 	  
	  
	  
	  
